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Abstract
A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these inci-
dents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and
other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by imple-
menting changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated
the risk of occurrence of safety incidents. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and
prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis
to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The work presented in this paper
builds on a previously developed architecture for safety, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring
and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics
such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and
monitored in real time (online). The intent of this paper is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface
and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources
from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii)
recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.
I. Introduction
The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) is a complex aviation system composed of facilities, airports, and
airspace. Ensuring the safety of all persons, aircraft, and stakeholders involved in the operations of such a complex
system is a critical role of the NAS. To mitigate risk and maintain safety, rules, regulations, policies, and procedures
are implemented to cover personnel, equipment, and aircraft at different phases of flight. As a result of these efforts to
ensure that operators, aircraft, and necessary technology work cohesively and safely, the NAS is safe with significantly
low accident rates and a minimal number of fatalities.
Although the safety of the NAS is currently at acceptable levels, the volume of air traffic in the national airspace,
which has increased significantly within the past few decades, is projected to increase even more as demand increases.1
The integration of unmanned aerial systems into the airspace will increase NAS usage and further stretch the capabil-
ities of the NAS. As a result, to ensure the continued safety of all persons, aircraft, vehicles, and infrastructure in the
airspace, a proactive approach must be taken to prevent and mitigate possible safety violations and incidents. Further-
more, more emphasis has historically been placed on ensuring safety during the take-off, climb, cruise, descent, and
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landing phases of flight as opposed to the push-back, standing, and taxiing operations.2 It is imperative that all phases
of aircraft operations, in air and on the ground, are included in the holistic NAS safety endeavor.
A few tools have been developed to increase airport ground safety through aircraft tracking within and outside
the U.S. NAS. The European air traffic management agency, EUROCONTROL, utilizes the Advanced-Surface Move-
ment Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) - a surveillance, airport safety support, routing and guidance ser-
vice - to maintain ground safety and throughput in European airports in all weather conditions.3 However, current
ground surveillance technology has some limitations. Surface Movement Radars (SMR) are susceptible to shadows,
reflections, or obstruction by airport buildings. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) systems only
provide information relative to other ADS-B-equipped systems, and ground receivers that utilize ADS-B can derive
location information only if aircraft transponders are switched on and functional. To fill gaps in A-SMGCS surveil-
lance, several projects have worked on surface tracking methods. One of these is a cost-effective video tracking
system developed by Bloisi et al.4 In addition, the European Commission’s INTERVUSE project developed artificial
intelligence systems that fill in A-SMGCS blind spots using a network of intelligent digital cameras.5 These include
the TRAVIS system, which used a network of calibrated cameras to detect motion, and the ISMAEL project, which
tracked magnetic signatures of ferromagnetic objects. These have all been tested in European airports with promising
results.6
In addition to the plans and procedures outlined in the SMGCS,7 the United States also uses two newer variants
of the A-SMGCS: the Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) and the Airport Surface Detection Equipment,
Model X (ASDE-X). Deployed across 44 airports (9 ASSC, 35 ASDE-X), both use similar technologies to the A-
SMGCS, combining multiple sensor layers from SMRs using Multilateration (MLAT), Airport Surveillance Radar
(ASR), and ADS-B information. A Multi-Sensor Data Processor (MDSP) uses safety logic to alert controllers to
potential conflicts. While very accurate, these systems require updates and replacements and also have high operating
and maintenance costs.8–10
Although these improved tracking systems increase ground safety, they typically provide short look-ahead safety
nets without predictive capabilities and do not handle the uncertainty inherent in measurements. It is therefore impor-
tant to consider ground operations as part of a comprehensive NAS safety effort to predict and mitigate unsafe incidents
early enough, while considering the uncertainty in forecasts and predictive models. Roychoudhury et al11 developed
one such comprehensive approach to monitoring NAS safety by creating a framework for real-time safety monitor-
ing (RTSM) and prediction of pre-defined safety metrics in the NAS. This framework is configurable and allows for
the incorporation of any safety hazard that can be quantified and modeled. To develop the RTSM system, environ-
mental, airspace, and human workload hazards were extracted offline from databases of the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). These hazards were then converted to safety metrics - quantities of interest that can be evaluated based on
available data and are predictive of an unsafe incident. The safety metrics, such as risk of collision with aircraft/vehi-
cle/structure, can then be modeled offline, monitored online, and predicted online to determine the likelihood of the
metrics crossing pre-defined safety thresholds and leading to unsafe events, such as a loss of separation.
To that effect, this paper focuses on the expansion of the predictive RTSM framework to ground safety hazards, as
the current safety metrics for the RTSM framework do not account for hazards to ground operations that occur during
standing, pushback, and taxi phases of flight. Although a variety of safety incidents are investigated, this paper focuses
only on those safety incidents which can be quantified, modeled, and predicted, such as aircraft collisions during taxi.
Unpredictable incidents, such as a passenger trips and falls, are outside the scope of this paper and are only briefly
discussed.
This paper is structured as follows: first an overview of the RTSM framework, previously developed, is presented.
The literature review methods to identify ground operation hazards, incidents, and accidents are then discussed. After
which the safety metrics are developed for the pervasive prevailing predictable incidents observed in the literature
study. A conclusion and guide to future work, based on the safety metrics and inclusion into the RTSM framework, is
finally presented.
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II. Real-Time Safety Monitoring Framework Overview
The Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM) framework is a novel architecture developed to monitor and predict the
safety of the NAS in real time. The authors of this paper and other RTSM publications consider the term real time or in
time to mean as ”required by the user or necessitated by the process under consideration”.12 The framework can (i) be
used to model, monitor, and predict hazards to flight as long as the hazard can be modeled quantitatively, (ii) rigorously
handle the inherent uncertainties associated with the defined hazards, and (iii) give an overall safety assessment of not
just individual flight hazards in the NAS but also an aggregate safety assessment of the NAS or a region of the NAS.
This section describes the process of identifying hazards to safety in the NAS and the development of the safety metrics
for integration in the RTSM framework. Brief overviews of the modeling, monitoring, and prediction facets are also
presented, along with a demonstration of how the framework is utilized to monitor and predict unsafe events in the
NAS.
A. Hazard Identification and Development of Safety Metrics
The NASA ASRS13 and NTSB14 databases were studied to identify hazards to NAS operations that were frequently
occurring or particularly important to safety. These hazards were characterized into four different categories: (i)
airspace-related hazards such as congestion or a loss of separation between aircraft, (ii) environmental hazards such
as convective weather or bird/animal strikes, (iii) human performance hazards such as pilot or controller error/fatigue,
and (iv) aircraft malfunction hazards such as engine or landing gear failure.11 For the hazards identified, the focus was
on those which could be modeled and predicted based on available data sources. Hazards that could not be predicted or
modeled are outside the scope of the RTSM framework and include mechanical hazards such as undiscovered mechan-
ical issues, operational hazards such as disgruntled pilots/ controllers and inadequate corporate procedures/policies,
and human-related hazards such as lack of situational awareness or confusion by pilots and controllers.11
After the individual predictable hazards for the different categories are extracted from the literature, a set of safety
metrics and associated thresholds are then developed. These safety metrics, φ, are represented as algebraic functions
of NAS states that can be propagated in time. They are quantities of interest that can be monitored and predicted
in order to predict unsafe events. In this paper, an unsafe event is defined as a transition event from an acceptable
to unacceptable region of φ. The boundaries between the acceptable and unacceptable regions are defined through
threshold equations, TE(φ(k))11 which can be obtained from subject matter experts, FAA and ICAO (International
Civil Aviation Organization) regulations, airline Safety Management Systems (SMS), aviation best practices, etc. Al-
though these safety metrics and associated threshold equations/values can be non-trivial to determine, the customizable
RTSM framework allows individual users/operators to modify the safety metrics and thresholds so long as there are
appropriate data sources for modeling and prediction.
As an example, a loss of separation between two aircraft, considered an unsafe event, can be predicted by monitor-
ing the aircraft separation distance between the two aircraft. In this case, the safety metric is the aircraft separation
with a safety metric function of parameters that may utilize the aircraft identifiers, aircraft velocities, intended flight
path, coordinates, etc., to output the distance and altitude difference between the two aircraft as well as their relative
headings with respect to one another.11 The threshold in this case can be obtained from aviation separation standards
for en-route flight: 5 miles for lateral separation and 1000 feet for vertical separation. In the following sections, an
overview is given of how the safety metrics are monitored with respect to their thresholds by keeping track of a safety
margin, the distance between the current value of a safety metric and its pre-defined threshold.
B. Monitoring and Prediction
Once the safety metrics are defined and hazards identified, a model-based approach is utilized to develop models of
the different components of the NAS in order to monitor and predict their evolution with time. At any discrete time k
the NAS is in some state
x(k) = [x1(k), x2(k), ..., xn(k)]
T , (1)
where xi(k) can be aircraft positions and velocities, weather positions, etc., for i = 1 : n where n is the number of
states under consideration in the NAS. From these states, a vector of safety metrics, φ can be computed from algebraic
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functions, F, of the states. Thus, if we know the state of the NAS, x, at any discrete point in time, k, we can compute
the associated safety vector, φ.
Within the space ofφ, unsafe regions exist that are unacceptable to NAS operators and stakeholders. These regions
correspond to unsafe events e ∈ E such as an aircraft encountering a convective weather region, another aircraft’s wake
vortex, or a loss of separation.
E = {e1, e2, . . . , ep}. (2)
The boundary between a safe/acceptable and unsafe/unacceptable region of φ is defined through a threshold func-
tion, oE(k), which utilizes the thresholds that come from aviation standards and best practices. Each element of oE(k)
is a Boolean variable, oei(k), that indicates whether its corresponding event, ei, has occurred (oei(k) = true) or not
(oei(k) = false). If no unsafe event has occurred, the NAS is in an acceptable state and vice versa.
When the NAS crosses into an unsafe/unacceptable region, the time of occurrence, ke, for that unsafe event, e, is
defined as the first time at which its threshold function, oei(k), evaluates to true. Thus, for all possible combination of
unsafe events under consideration in the NAS, a vector of unsafe event times can be represented as
kE =

ke1
ke2
...
kep
 . (3)
All of these quantities, including the state of the NAS are inherently uncertain. The RTSM framework is developed
to handle these uncertainties by representing the states and safety metrics as probability distributions as opposed to
point estimates. Furthermore, future states and inputs to the NAS, such as wind magnitudes and directions, weather
forecasts, and aircraft intended flight paths are also uncertain, necessitating representations in terms of probability
density functions.11, 15
The RTSM architecture can be viewed as a two-part problem involving (i) monitoring the safety metrics and
their evolution in time and (ii) predicting the likelihood of an unsafe event occurring within a specified look-ahead
time frame. The monitoring facet involves computing the probability distribution of the safety metrics, p(φ(k)), at a
current time k from NAS state estimates obtained using nonlinear estimation techniques such as unscented Kalman
filters or particle filters.15 The prediction problem focuses on using uncertainty propagation techniques such as Monte
Carlo sampling to compute the probability distribution of future NAS states, safety metrics p(ΦkHk ), and safety-related
events occurring within a prediction horizon kH > k.15, 17 For detailed information on the development, modeling,
monitoring, and prediction aspects of the RTSM framework, References [11, 15–17] should be consulted.
C. Demonstration
In this section, we present a scenario showing how the RTSM framework can be used to monitor and predict a wake
turbulence encounter in the terminal airspace15 of the San Francisco International Airport (SFO). Aircraft wake vor-
tices, created by lift-generating aircraft in flight,18–20 can be detrimental to smaller trailing aircraft without the control
authority to trim the large induced moments experienced in the wake.21, 22 In this scenario, we consider two aircraft
depicted in Fig. 1: a light aircraft A1 waiting to take off from runway 01L, and a large aircraft A2, coming in for a
landing on crossing runway 28L. As the scenario unfolds, strong crosswinds, depicted with the dashed arrows in Fig.
1, prevent the pilot of A2 from maintaining directional control, necessitating a go-around. As he accelerates the A2
aircraft and begins to generate lift for the go-around, a region of turbulent wake vortex is formed behind. Interactions
between residual wake vortices and trailing aircraft are rare in the terminal airspace, thus a controller may not be
cognizant of the wake turbulence generated by A2 as he clears A1 for departure. In this case, the wake vortex from
A1 is present and detrimental to the lighter A1 aircraft preparing to depart from the crossing runway.
To model, monitor, and predict the encounter between aircraft A1 and the wake, the elements for the RTSM
framework are first extracted from the scenario. The unsafe event, e, is the encounter of a wake turbulence region by
an aircraft. This unsafe event can be predicted by monitoring the safety metric φ, the distance between aircraft A1
and the wake turbulence region of A2. To model this distance, a simple vortex model is created to define the wake
4
Figure 1. RTSM Demonstration: Wake Turbulence Encounter (Aircraft not drawn to scale)15
turbulence region as a function of the wake-generating aircraft position, wind direction, and time.17 The safety metric
is constantly monitored and predictions are made every 10 s with up to a five-minute look-ahead time. Thus, we can
compute the probability of a wake turbulence encounter as well as the time and location of the encounter. This is also
depicted in Fig. 1 which shows the yellow wake turbulence region generated by aircraft A2 after its missed approach,
the predicted time of a wake vortex encounter (t = 220s) and the predicted location of wake turbulence encounter, the
red region.
III. Surface Operations Hazard Analysis
Similar to the hazard identification during the RTSM framework development, two primary sources for accident
and incident reporting were utilized in this paper: the NTSB database14 and the NASA ASRS database.13 Over 600
reports were queried for the NTSB study, spanning multiple decades of incidents during the standing, taxi, takeoff, and
landing phases of flight for Part 121 Air Carriers. Additionally, 50 reports from the ASRS database were characterized
by incidents on the ramp, runway, and taxiway. Finally, an assessment of runway incursions and their contributing
factors was done using Skybrary,23 a wiki of aviation safety information created by the European Organization for
the Safety of Air Navigation, ICAO, and the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF). This literature review shows that human
errors and non-compliance with operating policies and procedures are pervasive and dominant factors that lead to
surface incidents. A histogram of the most frequent ASRS categories associated with these incidents is shown in
Fig. 2. Fig. 2, which depicts the number of ACN (ASRS Record Number) records broken down by cause, shows
that ”human factors” causes greatly exceed all other causes. Weather conditions, faulty communication tools, and
malfunctioning ground service equipment, though present, emerged as lesser causes.
IV. Ground Incident Classification
The three databases, NTSB, ASRS, and Skybrary, were utilized to identify potential hazards to ground operations
and classify them as either predictable hazards, which can be measured, modeled, and predicted using real-time data,
or unpredictable hazards, which cannot. The underlying difference between the two lies in the quantification of a
safety precursor that will indicate a certain hazard or incident. For instance, the failure of a taxiing aircraft to maintain
clearance from another aircraft waiting on the ramp is considered to be an incident which can potentially be predicted
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Figure 2. Breakdown of ASRS Incidents During Taxi
with a short look-ahead and avoided with relevant data precursors. On the other hand, there are no data precursors that
allow prediction of a flight attendant tripping over his foot, falling, and fracturing his wrist.
In Section A, we provide an overview of the unpredictable ground incidents with a list of examples. We then
discuss the predictable incidents in Section B and classify them into three categories: aircraft to aircraft collisions that
occur during taxi, collisions between aircraft and other vehicle (tractors, tugs, and aircraft) that occur during pushback,
and predictable weather-related incidents.
A. Unpredictable Ground Incidents
Most accidents and incidents (collectively referred to as ”incidents” in this paper) that occur during airport surface
operations arise from causes which cannot be measured, modeled, or predicted using the RTSM framework. These
incidents include:
• Runway incursions, the ”incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface
designated for the landing and takeoff of an aircraft,”23 can be unpredictable particularly if the incursion is a
pedestrian or foreign object debris (FOD).
• Passenger or flight attendant loss of balance, trips, and falls.14
• Inadvertent throttle movement by flight crew member and captain’s inadequate supervision during engine start
sequence.14
• Lack of situational awareness by catering or deicing truck drivers causing impact to parked airplane.14
• Ramp service clerk, station manager, baggage handler, or other ground crew member inadvertently walking into
a spinning propeller and sustaining injuries.14
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• Equipment failure such as nose landing gear separation, fractured tow bar, fatigue failure of the wheel assembly,
cabin door jamming and becoming inoperative, etc.14
• Airport’s improper decision to ignore current standards. For instance, deactivating a jet braking system resulting
in collision between jet bridge and aircraft during a wind gust.14
The list above is by no means exhaustive of the unpredictable incidents discovered during the hazard analysis and liter-
ature review. To mitigate this category of incidents, the authors recommend adherence to current standards, operating
procedures, and regulatory practices established by airlines, the FAA, and other stakeholders.
B. Predictable Ground Incidents
Three classes of pervasive predictable incidents are identified in the databases: wingtip to tail/wingtip collision be-
tween a taxiing aircraft and a standing aircraft, collisions during pushback either between a tug and an aircraft or
between two aircraft, and lastly, weather-related incidents due to icing, snow, etc. Fig. 3 shows the relative frequency
of occurrence of the three categories in the NTSB database. Predictable incidents that do not fall in any of the three cat-
egories are also depicted and classified as ”other” in Fig. 3. Examples of these include jet blast incidents on congested
taxiways or a loss of separation between aircraft departing from intersecting runways.14 Aircraft collisions during taxi
are the most pervasive ground incidents, occurring 45% of the time as seen in Fig. 3 while weather-related incidents
occur less frequently. These NTSB results, showing the non-pervasive nature of weather-related incidents and the
high number of aircraft-aircraft collisions during taxi that result primarily from human factors, are in agreement with
the ASRS assessment depicted in Fig. 2. The next few sections give detailed explanations of the three classes of
predictable incidents.
Figure 3. Categories and Frequencies of Predictable Incident Types
1. Aircraft-Aircraft Ground Collisions During Taxi
During the taxi phase of flight, there are numerous incidents of the wingtip/winglet of the taxiing aircraft impacting
the horizontal/vertical tail of an adjacent aircraft. In these cases, the pilot of the taxiing aircraft underestimates the
proximity of the standing aircraft and makes a judgement call to pass, resulting in a collision. In some cases, the
co-pilot or support crew, who provide feedback to the pilot taxiing on the availability of clearance, also misjudge the
distance between the two aircraft. One pervasive contributing factor to these collisions is that the wingtips of certain
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transport aircraft, such as the B767, are not visible from the cockpit unless the windows are open. Thus, when there
are multiple aircraft in close proximity, the pilots of a taxiing aircraft make decisions about maneuvering around the
stationary aircraft using incomplete and inaccurate distance information.
2. Collisions During Pushback
Pushback operations lead to another category of incidents that occur when an aircraft is being pushed away from the
gate using a pushback tractor or tug operated by a driver. With these incidents, the tug driver fails to maintain clearance
from a nearby aircraft as he/she pushes the aircraft from the gate. A lack of situational awareness of nearby aircraft,
inadequate visual look-out, or an underestimation of the proximity of the adjacent aircraft leads to collisions which can
be prevented by current operating procedures. The tug operators work with wing walkers to ensure safe operations, but
occasionally, there is a failure of the tug operator to monitor the wing walker and obtain position information of the tug,
the aircraft being pushed back, and other aircraft in the vicinity. During pushback, there are also multiple incidents
of the tug operator losing control of the vehicle, resulting in the tug striking the aircraft and causing damage. The
collisions that occur during tug operations where vehicle control is maintained by the tug operator, may be predictable
with accurate dimensions and precise position information of the tug/tractor, aircraft being towed, and nearby aircraft
which may be impacted.
3. Weather-Related Incidents
Weather-related ground incidents appear as recurring sources of aircraft damage in both NTSB and ASRS reports.14, 23
In the ASRS database, the five most common causes of weather-related taxiing incidents (and number of incidents of
each) were rain (489), snow (326), ice (228), fog (220), and thunderstorms (153). However, weather conditions may
contribute to the incidents indirectly, as only 108 total incidents listed weather as the primary problem.14 NTSB reports
for standing and taxiing incidents cite causes for weather-related incidents as ground contamination, the presence of
deicers on taxiways and ramps, decreased visibility, unexpected hazards, and loss of aircraft control (exacerbated
by inadequate pilot training for crosswind conditions and a lack of dissemination of wind information by ATC14).
Existing hazards can lead to incidents through failure to follow existing policies and procedures regarding speed,
ground communication, surveillance of aircraft, flight attendant safety, or tugs and belt loaders. Recurring issues for
weather-related incidents as described in the NTSB and ASRS database reports searched can be categorized as follows:
• Tugs slip and collide with aircraft from ramp or taxiway contamination due to snow/ice, rain, or slush.14
• Icy conditions cause the presence of deicers and snow plows, which can cause incidents through human error
and collision with aircraft in low visibility conditions.14
• Wind causes unexpected hazards for airline or ground crew, in the form of blowing doors, windows, baby
strollers, and deicing fluid.14
• Flight attendants can be injured due to not following safety procedures in gusty wind conditions.14
• Wind causes loss of aircraft control by pilot and debris collision with windshield.14
• Fog/mist causes lack of visibility, which contributes to aircraft collision or runway excursions.14
• Snow negatively impacts braking quality.13
In addition to weather-related causes, lighting conditions can also become hazards, with sun glare affecting visibility
and night conditions obscuring the edges of ramps or taxiways (particularly if combined with snow), sometimes
causing taxiway excursions. While many of these incidents themselves cannot be predicted, we can predict the adverse
conditions given appropriate weather forecasts and alert personnel of the increased risk to upcoming ground operations.
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V. Safety Metrics for Predictable Surface Incidents
The predictable hazards to safety, as defined in the previous section, can be transformed to safety metrics, for
which models can be developed to monitor and predict the hazards to ground operations. The goal is to monitor and
predict these safety metrics in real time so as to determine if and when an unsafe event may occur. Defining an unsafe
event, such as a collision between a taxiing and standing aircraft, requires an explicit safety threshold which delineates
the boundary between safe and unsafe for each safety metric. These safety thresholds are obtained from regulations
stipulated by the FAA and other regulatory bodies, aviation best practices, and company policies and procedures.11
Table 1 shows the safety metrics developed for ground/surface operations, function arguments, and outputs of the
safety metric functions. These function arguments may simply be parameters of interest such as aircraft position,
heading, and velocity, or they may be helper functions (defined in curly brackets) that are also safety metrics. An
example helper function is weather at coordinate, a safety metric in its own right, and a helper function for other
safety metrics such as the probability of runway excursion, risk of drifting foreign object debris (FOD-G), and taxi
complexity. Table 1 also shows example threshold equations that define the margins of safety and some of the data
required for the safety metric monitoring and prediction.
Table 1: Safety Metrics for Surface Operations
Safety Metric (SM) SM Function Arguments SM Function Outputs Threshold Equation Example Required Data Examples
Weather at coordi-
nate
Point of interest, time Matrix of all weather cat-
egories (e.g. precipitation,
wind, temperature, etc) and
their relevant properties (e.g.,
type, direction, severity, persis-
tence, etc.)
A threshold is needed for
each element of the matrix.
Examples: thunderstorm be-
gan = :08, precipitation.type =
ice.pellets
Current weather, forecast
weather
Surface visual range
(SVR) aka visibility
Point of interest, time,
{weather at coordinate}
Distance in feet SVR > 50 ft As required by ”Weather at co-
ordinate” SM
Ground services op-
erating status
Volume of interest, time Matrix of all service categories
(e.g., lights, tracking coverage,
runways, etc.) and operational
status (e.g., Inoperative, nomi-
nal)
servicesOperatingStatus.asde.x
= NOMINAL
NOTAMs (Notice to Airmen)
Degree of taxi route
normalcy
{Airport configuration at time
t}, {airport configuration at
time t+5}, {probability of
ramp/taxiway/runway conges-
tion}, {surface facilities oper-
ating status}, off-nominal ops
(e.g., priority aircraft, etc.)
NOTAMs regarding closed
taxiways, standard taxi routes,
expected airport reconfigura-
tion
Taxi complexity Taxi clearance, time, {weather
at coordinate}, {degree of taxi
route normalcy}
Complexity category, e.g., low,
medium, high
taxiComplexity < MEDIUM Airport layout, location of hot
spots, taxi clearance
Airport configu-
ration at a given
time
Time, {weather at coordinate} Runways in use, taxi routes in
use
Current and forecast weather,
especially wind magnitude
and direction, airport layout,
standard operating procedures,
traffic forecasts
Risk of aircraft colli-
sion with aircraft/ve-
hicle/structure
Position, heading and speed
of ownship, position, heading,
and speed of other aircraft/ve-
hicle/structure, {probability of
ramp/taxiway/runway conges-
tion}
Nearest distance (ft), risk cate-
gory. e.g., none, low, medium,
high
ProximityViolation = NONE Position and heading of air-
craft, aircraft type and dimen-
sions, winglet type, weather,
airport infrastructure informa-
tion e.g., locations and dimen-
sions
Probability of ram-
p/taxiway/runway
contamination
Point of interest, time,
{weather at coordinate}
Probability of all contamina-
tion categories such as ice e.g.,
black ice, slush, water; {FOD
debris}; dead wildlife
rwyContamination.blackIce =
0
Current and forecast weather,
PIREPs (Pilot Reports), run-
way condition reports;
Table 1: Safety Metrics for Surface Operations
Safety Metric (SM) SM Function Arguments SM Function Outputs Threshold Equation Example Required Data Examples
Probability of vehi-
cle loss of control on
the ground (LOC-G)
Point of interest, time,
{probability of taxiway con-
tamination}, {weather at
coordinate}
Risk category, e.g., none, low,
medium, high
VehicleLOCG≤ LOW Current and forecast weather
providing information about
surface icing
Risk of drifting For-
eign Object Debris
(FOD-G)
Point of interest, time,
{weather at coordinate}, FOD
at nearby coordinates
risk category, e.g., none, low,
medium, high
FODGRisk≤ LOW FOD existence (e.g., camera-
fed image recognition)
Risk of jet blast Point of interest, time Risk category, e.g., none, low,
medium, high
jetblastRisk≤ LOW Precise position and heading of
all operating aircraft
Probability of ram-
p/taxiway/runway
congestion
{Airport configuration at a
given time}, {weather at co-
ordinate}, {aircraft at coordi-
nate}
Comparison to expected con-
gestion, i.e. low, normal, high
probCongestion≤ NORMAL Data required for the helper
functions
Probability of pilot
error during ground
ops
Pilot id, time, {taxi complex-
ity}, {visibility conditions}
Probability in percentages pilotErrorProb < 10% Position and heading of air-
craft, plus all the data required
for the helper functions
Probability of con-
troller error on
ground ops
Controller id, time, {Ground
service operating sta-
tus}, {taxi complexity},
{Controller workload}
Probability in percentages controllerErrorProb < 1% Data required for the helper
functions
VI. Conclusion
Although commercial aviation has made significant progress in terms of safety, surface operations during aircraft
taxiing, pushback, and standing, remain risky and accident-prone. This paper builds on prior efforts in monitoring NAS
safety in real time using a novel approach, the Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM) framework. The goal of this
paper is to create a holistic NAS safety effort that includes both air and ground operations by laying the groundwork
for extension of the RTSM architecture to airport surface operations.
In this paper, we develop a set of safety metrics that can be monitored and predicted in real time to provide safety
assessments of NAS surface operations. Hazards to the safety of persons, aircraft, facilities, and NAS infrastructure
are investigated and categorized into ”unpredictable” and ”predictable incidents.” Unpredictable incidents, caused
primarily by disregard of existing FAA rules, regulations, and company procedures, may be prevented by personnel
compliance with policies and procedures. For the predictable surface incidents, safety metrics, data sources required,
and safety thresholds, are developed for integration into the RTSM framework to enable real time monitoring and
prediction of ground incidents.
This work can also be integrated into other safety management systems such as the the FAA’s System Safety Man-
agement (SSM) portfolio that utilizes tools such as the Integrated Safety Assessment Model (ISAM) to identify safety
incident precursors and model various system safety scenarios. One novelty of the RTSM framework in comparison to
other approaches is in its systematic handling of uncertainty inherent in data sources, modeling, and prediction. With
continued development and integration of data from safety net tracking systems such as ASDE-X, uncertainty in the
data can be reduced to improve results for other architectures without the capability to manage uncertainty.
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